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On January 11, 1994, the Chief Accountant o f the Securities and Exchange Commission 
delivered a speech at a gathering of accountants in Washington, D.C., in which he criticized 
independent auditors for "supporting their clients' incredible accounting proposals." He also 
stated that accounting firms are becoming "cheerleaders on the issue o f accounting for stock 
options issued to employees."
In March 1993, the Public Oversight Board published a report, In the Public Interest: 
Issues Confronting the Accounting Profession, in which it also expressed concern for the 
independence and objectivity o f the auditing profession.
Because o f the gravity o f the Chief Accountant's remarks—independence and objectivity 
are the raison d'etre o f the auditor—and its own professed concerns, the Board decided to 
appoint an Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence to assess the dimensions o f the 
problem and recommend steps to bolster the professionalism of the independent auditor and 
to assess the working relationships among the profession, the SEC, and the FASB.
The persons asked to undertake this task were;
Donald J. Kirk, a founding member of the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
who served for 14 years, 9 as chairman; presently a professor at the Columbia 
University Graduate School of Business and a member o f the boards o f directors 
and audit committees of several large enterprises; and earlier a partner o f a major 
accounting firm. Mr. Kirk served as chairman o f the Advisory Panel.
George D. Anderson, founder and retired head of Anderson ZurMuehlen & Co., a 
distinguished accounting firm in Helena, Montana; former chairman of the American 
Institute of CPAs; and a recognized leader o f the accounting profession.
Ralph S. Saul, formerly director o f the SEC's Division o f Trading and Markets and 
associate director o f the SEC's Special Study of the Securities Markets; president of 
the American Stock Exchange and chief executive off i cer o f CIGNA Corp.; and 
presently a director and audit committee member of several companies.
The Advisory Panel spent six months interviewing 77 professionals, business executives, 
attorneys, academics, and others who they thought could contribute to their inquiry. They 
reviewed 22 written submissions that they received in response to their requests, as well as 
numerous other reports and studies.
POB The Public Oversight Board is an independent, private sector body that monitors and  reports on the self-regulatory programs and activities of the SEC Practice Section of the 
Division for CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
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The Panel's report, which accompanies this letter, has been reviewed carefully by the Public 
Oversight Board. The Board believes it is an outstanding description of th e  most critical 
problems confronting the accounting profession and of related corporate governance issues. 
The Board believes that the report's conclusions are sound and must be heeded to  avoid a 
further deterioration o f confidence in the accounting profession and in the integrity o f the 
financial information on which our economic system relies.
The report urges the accounting profession to look to the board of directors—the 
shareholders' representative—as the audit client, not corporate management. It calls for a 
direct interfa ce between the entire board and the auditor at least annually, and an expanded 
interfa ce with the audit committee.
To increase the value of the audit, the Advisory Panel calls for a new level o f candor from 
the auditor. Auditors would not only apprise the board o f what is acceptable accounting, 
they would be expected to express their views, as accounting experts, on the 
appropriateness o f the accounting principles used or proposed by the company, the clarity 
o f its financial disclosures, and the degree o f aggressiveness or conservatism o f the 
accounting principles and underlying estimates reflected in the company's financial 
statements.
That expansion o f the auditor's responsibilities is a fa r-reaching, perhaps revolutionary, 
proposal, one that is responsive to complaints about "lowest common denominator" 
accounting principles often applied with "rose colored glasses."
These and the other important conclusions o f the Panel, including those aimed at improving 
the relationships among the accounting profession, the SEC, and accounting standard 
setters deserve the careful study o f all concerned with the integrity o f financial reporting, 
auditing, and corporate governance processes in this country.
The report is a clear call for completion of a process that has long been developing and that 
has been presaged in reports o f the Cohen Commission (1978) and the Treadway 
Commission (1987), among others. In it lies the hope for more credible, relevant, and 
meaningful financial information
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STRENGTHENING THE PROFESSIONALISM
OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR
I. PREFACE
In February 1994, the Public Oversight Board (POB) of the SEC Practice Section 
(SECPS) o f the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) appointed a 
three-member Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence. The POB charged the Advisory 
Panel to determine whether;
the SEC Practice Section, the accounting profession or the SEC should take 
steps to better assure the independence of auditors and the integrity and 
objectivity of their judgments on the appropriate application of generally 
accepted accounting principles to financial statements.
The Panel’s observations and suggestions on those matters are set forth in this report.
MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY PANEL ON AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
 
Donald J. Kirk, Chairman 
George D. Anderson
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II. INTRODUCTION
Background
In March 1993, the POB published a comprehensive Special Report, In the Public 
Interest: Issues Confronting the Accounting Profession. That report contained 25 
recommendations of specific actions to enhance the usefulness and reliability of financial 
statements, strengthen the performance and professionalism of the public accounting 
profession, including the ability o f auditors to detect fr aud and illegalities, and improve 
self-regulation.
In Chapter V o f the Special Report, the POB expressed concern that the profession’s 
objectivity, independence, and public responsibility would be compromised if, in the 
pursuit o f client service, audit firms became advocates o f their clients’ positions in 
financial reporting matters. That concern resulted in the POB making three 
recommendations (V-3, V-4, and V-5) aimed at strengthening independence and 
professionalism and six others (V-6 through V-11) intended to improve financial reporting 
and corporate governance. Those nine POB recommendations relate directly to the work 
o f the Advisory Panel and are reproduced in Appendix A to this report.
In a speech on January 11, 1994, the Chief Accountant o f the SEC, Walter P. Schuetze, 
questioned the independence of accounting firms in situations in which they condoned or 
advocated what he called “incredible” accounting practices or were unduly influenced by 
client views in formulating positions on FASB proposals. The Panel’s appointment was 
prompted by issues raised in that speech. Mr. Schuetze had made similar charges in an 
August 1992 speech. (Our analysis o f the January 1994 speech is in Appendix B to this 
report.) The timing of Mr. Schuetze’s speech less than a year after the POB’s Special 
Report suggests that, in the view o f the Chief Accountant o f the SEC, the public 
accounting profession needs further examination.
The Panel’s Approach
In accepting their appointment, the Panel members understood that their charge 
encompassed, but was not limited to, (1) assessing the working relationship among the 
SEC, the FASB, the auditing profession, and the business community and (2) identifying 
and evaluating steps to bolster the objectivity, independence, and professionalism of 
auditing firms.
Further, although the charge asks the Panel to identify steps that might be taken by three 
specific groups—the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA, the public accounting firms, and 
the SEC— some of the Panel’s suggestions are directed beyond those three groups to
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corporate boards of directors and audit committees, corporate management, and the 
FASB.
M any of the concerns th a t the Panel has heard during its examination of aud ito r 
independence focus more on the perceived lack of objectivity of some auditors in 
their acquiescence, approval, and even advocacy of w hat critics believe to be 
questionable or inappropriate accounting principles and practices of their c lients.
Consequently, this R eport addresses questions about the integrity and objectivity of 
auditors to a greater extent than  independence, although the three concepts are 
in terre la ted  Integrity is the basis for public trust. I t requires the aud ito r to be 
honest and candid and never to subordinate principle or professional judgm ent. 
O bjectivity gives value to the aud ito r’s services. I t  requires the auditor to be 
im partial, intellectually honest, and free from conflicts of interest. Independence 
requires an auditor’s freedom from both the fact and appearance of conflicts of 
interest.
In preparing this Report the Panel members have read prior studies and reports on the role 
of the independent auditor, solicited written comments, and interviewed many 
knowledgeable people, all identified in Appendix C. The Panel is indebted and grateful to 
all who volunteered their help in the course o f this study.
The Panel has been ably assisted by Jerry D. Sullivan and Marcia E. Brown, Executive 
Director and Administrative Manager, respectively, o f the Public Oversight Board, and by 
Paul Pacter, Professor o f Accounting at the University o f Connecticut’s Stamford MBA 
Program. However, the views expressed herein are solely those o f the Panel members.
The Panel has avoided the temptation to make a list o f detailed recommendations, in part 
because o f the comprehensiveness o f the POB Special Report o f March 1993, and also 
because the POB is better served by a less structured report. For those reasons, the 
Panel’s report takes the form of suggestions based on the numerous interviews the 
Panel conducted and Panel m em bers’ personal experiences in the business 
community and in various aspects of the  profession. W hile several of the Panel’s 
suggestions are fairly specific, most are broad in scope and intended to challenge 
and stim ulate the profession and other participants in the financial reporting 
process to consider the long-range future of the profession and ways to bolster the 
independent audit. While the Panel’s observations and suggestions have been discussed 
in general terms with knowledgeable persons, this Report has not been exposed for 
comment prior to its submission to the POB. The Panel anticipates that the POB will give 
the suggestions in its report careful consideration before endorsing any o f them or 
recommending any action to affected parties.
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III. THE PROFESSIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The independent audit fills an essential role for the investing public and creditors by 
enhancing the reliability o f corporations’ published financial statements and giving 
assurance o f that reliability to users o f those financial statements. Conscious o f its public 
responsibility, the profession has devoted considerable time and money to improving its 
performance as independent auditors. Over the past quarter century, numerous thoughtful 
studies o f auditor performance have been conducted, many of which are listed in Appendix 
C. Based on those studies, important and in some cases dramatic structural changes have 
been made in the way professional standards are set and audits are conducted.
For many years, the profession has enjoyed public goodwill and confidence that remain its 
greatest assets. However, as the 1993 POB Special Report noted, public respect and 
confidence are jeopardized if the profession’s integrity, objectivity, and independence are 
questioned. Recently, widely publicized allegations of audit failures and improper financial 
practices by companies, particularly, although by no means exclusively, those related to 
the “savings and loan crisis,” have eroded the profession’s goodwill and public confidence. 
Those assets can be further dissipated if the profession’s audit services—the basis for its 
fr anchise— do not meet the needs o f corporate boards, stockholders, creditors, and the 
investing public. As the FOB Special Report stated, “attacks on the accounting profession 
from a variety o f sources suggested a significant public concern with the profession’s 
performance.”
The profession is at a critical juncture. Even though great strides have been made in 
ensuring, through peer reviews, that the processes within firms' for conducting an audit are 
o f high quality, there are serious issues that remain to be addressed.
New and complex business arrangements and financial transactions have complicated the 
resolution o f accounting questions, challenged the validity o f old answers, and increased 
the risks o f auditing. Audit risks also have increased because many industries are now 
subject to less government regulation. Moreover, information technology has changed the 
nature and complexity o f companies’ records and the speed and ease with which those 
records are produced and changed. Business failures generate wide media attention, 
litigation, enormous direct and indirect costs to taxpayers, and Congressional scrutiny of 
the accounting profession and standard setters. Fraudulent financial schemes, while rare, 
understandably make bold headlines and erode public confidence in corporate financial 
reporting.
The media, litigants, the Congress, and others often allege, rightly or wrongly, that audit 
failures contributed to many business failures. In that context, the public views audit 
failures as including not only the failure to discover and report material negative facts but 
also the failure o f financial statements to serve as an adequate early-warning device for the
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protection o f investors and creditors. Questionable accounting principles1 or inadequate 
disclosure are regarded as contributing to audit failures.
The cost o f real and perceived audit failures is immense. They have resulted in widespread 
skepticism about the objectivity o f the profession even after the many steps taken to lessen 
the “expectation gap.” They have also resulted in large monetary settlements and 
judgments and related costs that have made the major accounting firms virtually 
uninsurable. The risks associated with the auditing function have caused the major firms 
to manage their exposure more aggressively, for example, by turning down high risk 
clients and monitoring existing clients more closely. Those risks and competitive 
pressures have also caused the large accounting firms to encourage detailed accounting 
and auditing standards and clear guidance or consensus on how to apply them, thereby 
narrowing the scope o f professional judgment that might be questioned by a litigant 
alleging a loss due to a negligent audit. One consequence has been that audits have 
become more compliance or rule-book oriented.
There seems to be a growing cynicism at the SEC about the performance o f the public 
accounting profession. Perhaps as a result, the Commission’s staff has been less restrained 
in bypassing established private-sector standard-setting mechanisms. The Commission’s 
staff has used the registration process and the “bully pulpit” to identify what it believes are 
acceptable or unacceptable accounting practices, short-cutting the work o f the FASB 
Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF). Perhaps sensing the politicization o f the process for 
setting accounting standards, the business community has responded with enhanced and, 
at times, aggressive lobbying efforts for their preferred solutions with the FASB, with the 
accounting firms, and in Washington.  
All o f this has come at the same time as many o f the larger firms have combined, spread 
out globally, and diversified the services offered to clients. Mergers, acquisitions, and 
restructurings in corporate America have severely aggravated competition among the Big 
6 for larger clients. Firms have also decried the quality o f undergraduate accounting 
education and either have not been able or have not chosen to hire graduates o f traditional 
MBA programs. Firms have watched the skills and intellect o f financial management staffs 
o f some clients grow to rival those o f the engagement teams servicing the client.
During the past decade, the corporate community has increased its involvement in the 
accounting standard-setting process. Many large companies now assign key people to 
monitor and influence the work o f standard setters, particularly the FASB and the AICPA 
Accounting Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC). As a result o f clients’ increasing 
internal competence in accounting and auditing, the value of the external audit as 
perceived by corporate financial management is lessened, and the audit is sometimes 
viewed and priced as a commodity. Some commentators to the Panel observed that 
independent auditing has increasingly emphasized evidence-gathering and compliance with 
rules and has left the judgments about accounting policies and disclosure practices largely
1In this report, accounting principles include not only broad guidelines of general application but also 
detailed practices and procedures for implementing them.
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to corporate financial managers. Financial managers aggressively control audit activity 
and costs and are in a position to orchestrate meetings o f the external auditor with the 
audit committee and the full board o f directors.
While accounting and auditing remain at the heart o f public accounting firms’ practices, 
the larger firms have become less reliant on revenues from this source and increasingly 
depend on consulting and other services, which carry higher margins and less risk and are 
more attractive to younger staff recruits. Studies show that the large public accounting 
firms today earn only about half of their revenue fr om auditing and accounting services, 
and some considerably less. Five o f the top seven consulting firms in the United States 
and six o f the top seven consulting firms worldwide are reported to be Big 6 firms. Some 
o f the firms now think o f themselves not as accounting and auditing firms but as multi-line 
professional service firms. Marketing materials and advertising present the firms to the 
world as business consulting organizations, not as auditors.
Overall, the Panel sees the foregoing trends as reducing the stature o f the independent 
audit at a time when public skepticism about the credibility and reliability of corporate 
financial information has increased. Those trends chip away at the objectivity o f the 
auditor and the value o f the independent audit.
Strengthening the professionalism of the auditor requires an environment in which boards 
o f directors and management o f client companies have high expectations about the 
auditing firms’ integrity, objectivity, and professional expertise and in which the auditor, in 
meeting those obligations, recognizes an overriding public responsibility. It requires an 
environment in which an auditor’s professional services truly do add value and are not 
looked on simply as a regulatory requirement imposed on the company. It requires an 
environment in which auditors can pursue their professional activities without undue fear 
o f liability and in which government and regulators balance their responsibilities for 
oversight against the need to let the profession function effectively in the private sector. 
These requirements are interconnected, and the future o f the profession rests on coming to 
grips with each o f them. However, there are no quick fixes—in the words of the POB’s 
charge to the Panel—  “to better assure the independence o f auditors and the integrity and 
objectivity o f their judgments on the appropriate application o f generally accepted 
accounting principles.”
IV. THE PANEL’S OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
The Panel was appointed by the Public Oversight Board o f the AICPA’s SEC Practice 
Section. Consequently, this report focuses on audits in the context o f public companies. 
Nonetheless, many o f the Panel’s observations and suggestions are applicable more 
broadly to the entire independent auditing function o f the public accounting profession. 
An auditor’s integrity, objectivity, and independence should not depend on whether the 
audit client’s securities are publicly traded.
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The Need for Additional Rules or Legislation on Auditor Independence
In March 1994, the staff o f the Office o f the Chief Accountant (OCA) o f the Securities 
and Exchange Commission published a comprehensive S ta ff Report on Auditor 
Independence. The OCA Report concludes:
The OCA believes that the combination o f the extensive systems o f 
independence requirements issued by the Commission and the AICPA, coupled 
with the Commission’s active enforcement program, provide to investors 
reasonable safeguards against loss due to the conduct o f audits by accountants that 
lack independence from their audit clients. The enactment o f detailed legislation or 
the promulgation o f additional rules is not necessary.
The OCA believes that further legislation or fundamental changes in the 
Commission’s regulations are not necessary at this time for the protection of 
investors. [page 55]
The SEC and AICPA independence rules and interpretations focus on and guard 
against relationships th a t create the fact o r perception of a conflict of interests 
between auditor and client. The Panel has found no evidence of a need for actions 
by the SEC or by the AICPA to add to o r am end the extensive existing body of rules 
and regulations relating to aud ito r conflicts o f in te rest There is, of course, an 
ongoing need to keep those rules and regulations up to date to reflect changes in the 
business environment. The Panel also concurs with th e  view of OCA that fu rther 
legislation is not necessary for protection of investors.
The OCA Report discusses whether the SEC should adopt a rule mandating periodic 
rotation o f accounting firms conducting the audits o f the financial statements o f public 
companies. The OCA staff concludes that the Cohen Commission finding that the cost o f 
mandatory rotation would exceed the benefits is still valid. The OCA Report states that 
“[t]he SECPS requirement for a periodic change in the engagement partner... when 
coupled with the... second partner review” is effective and that “a well-informed, 
independent audit committee may be in the best position to decide when the benefits o f a 
change in auditors outweigh the costs” (page 54). It also should be noted that the SECPS 
recently reconsidered the mandatory rotation question and, in March 1992, issued a 
report, Statement o f  Position regarding M andatory Rotation o f Audit Firms o f Publicly 
H eld Companies, making a case in opposition to mandatory rotation. The Panel concurs 
w ith the conclusions of the Cohen Commission, OCA, and SECPS reports tha t a 
rule m andating the rotation of audit firms is im practical and not needed because of 
the significant costs and questionable benefits and because of other safeguards 
presently in place, such as p a rtn e r rotation and second-partner review.
The OCA Report also discusses whether the performance o f management advisory 
services (MAS) by auditors has an impact on auditor independence. After analyzing the
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nature and magnitude o f such services performed by the firms, the Report concludes that 
“the lack o f an apparent, dramatic increase in MAS provided to SEC audit clients, 
however, suggests that a fundamental change in the Commission’s regulations is not 
necessary at this time” (page 34).
The Panel was not specifically charged with assessing the appropriateness o f non-audit 
services offered by firms. Those services and their impact on firms’ independence have 
been the subject o f many earlier studies. A report prepared by the Big 6 accounting firms, 
“The Public Accounting Profession; Meeting the Needs of a Changing World” (January 
1991), suggested a new fr amework for defining independence. That proposed framework, 
which was rejected by the SEC staff and not adopted by the profession, downplayed 
concerns about the appearance of conflicts o f interest in arrangements with clients. For 
example, the report stated; “Business relationships between public accountants and audit 
clients do not impair independence as long as they result from the ordinary course o f 
business and are not material to either party.” That position fails to recognize the special 
responsibilities o f the independent auditor and the importance of avoiding the appearance 
o f a conflict o f interest. The position o f the Big 6 firms in that report was that “all 
services delivered under the umbrella o f a public accounting firm are subject to the same 
high professional standards o f objectivity, integrity, competence and due professional care 
required o f audit services.” However, the public responsibilities of the independent 
auditor hold the independent audit to an even higher standard.
While the existing conflict-of-interest rules and the various mechanisms for 
improving those rules are appropriate and adequate, there are important steps that 
should be taken in other ways to enhance the objectivity and strengthen the 
professionalism of independent auditors. The balance of this report sets forth the 
Panel’s suggestions for achieving those goals.
Independent Auditing Imposes Special Responsibilities 
on Accounting Firms
The Role of Auditing in Public Accounting Firms
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co.2 the Supreme Court of the United States 
described the independent audit as a “public watchdog” function and noted that “if 
investors were to view the auditor as an advocate for the corporate client, the value o f the 
audit might well be lost.” The growing trend to view client service as the objective o f all 
firm activities runs the risk o f failing to recognize the unique responsibility that attaches to 
the audit function. Client service can easily be equated with serving the management o f 
the corporate client, for example by searching for imaginative analogies to get an 
accounting result desired by the management. The Panel recognizes that the AICPA’s 
Code o f Conduct expects CPAs to “serve the public interest,” “honor the public trust,”
2United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
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and be objective in all their activities. Therefore, Arms need to emphasize to all 
professional staff, many of whom are not yet CPAs and may not have read the Code, 
th a t auditing is not ju s t one of many services offered to clients. I t  is special. I t 
involves a "public  responsibility transcending any employment relationship w ith the 
client.”
The Panel finds worrisome the trend o f accounting firms, in wanting to grow, to add or 
expand nonaudit services and thereby reduce their reliance on and the relative importance 
o f auditing. The increasing fact and threat o f litigation in the absence o f meaningful tort 
reform, along with competition and fee-cutting, have made auditing less and less 
financially attractive. Auditing is also beset by such personnel issues as a declining 
percentage o f the best and brightest college graduates going into the accounting 
profession and the unattractiveness o f beginning assignments in audit activity.
Growing reliance on nonaudit services has the potential to compromise the objectivity or 
independence o f the auditor by diverting firm leadership away fr om the public 
responsibility associated with the independent audit function, by allocating 
disproportionate resources to other lines o f business within the firm, and by seeing the 
audit function as necessary just to get the benefit o f being considered objective and to 
serve as an entree to sell other services.
Further, by creating specialties along industry lines, large firms have sought to be in a 
better position to market their services to potential clients and to audit existing clients 
more effectively. However, industry specialization has a downside. It may result in a loss 
o f objectivity if the specialists get so close to the industry that they fail to challenge 
industry practices that fall short o f providing the most relevant and reliable accounting 
information. The Panel believes that, in addition to the more focused industry expertise, 
the accounting and auditing judgments that arise in audit engagements require that broader 
expertise be brought to bear, for example, through consultation with the accounting firm’s 
national technical office.
The independent auditing firms need to focus on how the audit function can be 
enhanced and not submerged in large multi-line public accounting/management 
consulting firms. To do th a t may require tha t firms’ senior management reth ink 
the ir organization structures and business strategies. The regulators and overseers 
of the accounting profession should support the profession’s efforts in this regard.
O rganization of the Firm s’ Technical Accounting Functions
Two o f the principal functions o f an auditing firm’s technical accounting office are to 
respond to accounting questions fr om client service personnel and to develop firm 
positions on accounting questions under consideration by the FASB, the SEC, or other 
accounting standards bodies or professional committees.
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Internal Consultations
In its 1993 Special Report, the POB found in their review o f alleged audit failures that “in 
too many cases, however, the preference of client management—influenced at least in part 
by objectives other than producing the most reliable financial reporting possible in the 
circumstances— nevertheless prevailed over the preference of the auditing or consulting 
partner.”
Firms have tightened internal controls over technical accounting advice given to practice 
office partners. While no single form of structure or process is necessarily suitable for all 
firms, the objective in all cases should be a coordinated system that insures that disparate 
answers are not given to similar questions and that internal consultations take place on 
troublesome questions.
The importance of firms’ internal consultation procedures is underscored in the following 
communication distributed to partners by the Senior Partner o f Price Waterhouse:
Part o f my job as Senior Partner is to get involved when some sort of 
serious client service issue arises, and, lately, I’ve become involved in several 
troublesome situations where we’ve strayed down a path thought to be that of 
responsive client service. So let me briefly re-emphasize what outstanding client 
service is not.
Clients can and do become aggressive and demanding about wanting us to 
approve a particular treatment. But outstanding client service does not mean 
stretching rules beyond sound professional practice to satisfy a client whim—for, 
often, this leads to future problems for the client and the firm. It does not mean 
compromising our credibility with the SEC, IRS, or other regulatory bodies by 
championing a questionable client proposal that goes beyond the bounds o f sound, 
reasonable practice. It does not mean going along with a client’s too aggressive 
stance in an audit situation, rationalizing that there’s an offsetting item elsewhere 
in the accounts; going way out on a limb in approving a tax treatment in order to 
please a client for the moment; bending too far in supporting a client’s 
argument5—or its attorney—in a DA&CR [dispute analysis and corporate 
recovery] engagement; or cutting comers in a consulting engagement to meet 
unrealistic deadlines or budgets. Such activities not only demean us professionally, 
they really don’t help the client, and certainly not the firm, in the long run.
I know how tough it can be out there. That’s why we need to share the 
tough decisions with each other. In addition to easing the pressure on us as 
individuals, it makes it easier for us to arrive at the best professional decision. So 
as I’ve said many times before: Don’t feel you have to go it alone—consult with 
your partners when you’re confronting those tough calls.
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Public accounting firms should adopt mechanisms th a t ensure th a t (1) their national 
technical offices are independent of practice partners who feel the direct pressure 
from client companies; (2) the standard  to which the national technical office 
personnel should be held in advising engagement partners is not ju s t "what 
practices are acceptable” but "what is the most appropriate  accounting in the 
circum stance;” (3) client accounting positions are not brought before the SEC until 
th a t consultation has taken place; and (4) full inform ation about th e  facts and 
circumstances has been made available to the national technical office.
The importance of internal consultation on accounting matters was recognized by the POB 
in their recommendations V-5, V-7, and V-8. The Panel concurs with the thrust o f those 
recommendations and has more to say, later in this report, on the subject of the 
appropriateness o f accounting choices and accounting estimates.
Submissions to the FASB and the SEC
All o f the large public accounting firms participate actively in the development of 
accounting standards, and all have adopted internal procedures for reaching positions 
taken in submissions to the FASB and the SEC. At the same time, the business 
community, The Business Roundtable, and other industry associations have become 
increasingly organized and effective in lobbying the standard setters and their auditors.
Developing positions for submission to the FASB, the SEC, and AcSEC is p a rt of an 
accounting firm ’s public responsibility. Therefore, it is essential tha t the firm ’s 
internal organization and processes for developing those positions be insulated from 
undue pressure from or on behalf of clients. In  addition, communications about 
firm  positions on FASB proposals must be done in a judicious, professional way tha t 
does not appear to curry favor with clients or appear to be p a rt of an organized 
cam paign. Client-related motivations, o r even the appearance thereof, in reaching 
o r communicating accounting policy decisions can contribute to a decline in the 
integrity, objectivity, and professionalism of public accounting firms and in public 
respect for the profession. More is said on this subject later in this report under the 
heading o f “Responsibilities o f Accounting Firms in the Standard-Setting Process.”
POB Recommendations V-3, V-4, and V-5 address matters o f client advocacy and 
recognize that special care is needed to ensure that accounting firms’ “participation in the 
standard setting process is characterized by objectivity and professionalism.” The Panel 
endorses those recommendations and strongly supports the POB’s suggestion that 
standard setters and leaders o f the profession regularly discuss issues related to client 
advocacy.
Accounting firms should give careful thought to their policies and procedures for 
participating in the establishment o f professional standards. In that regard, the Panel 
commends an approach similar to that expressed by Deloitte & Touche;
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...We weigh the issues and alternatives and form our conclusions about the 
potential effectiveness o f proposed standards in improving the relevance and 
reliability of financial reporting. In evaluating input received from clients and 
others, we recognize that virtually every proposed professional standard will be 
perceived negatively by some clients and that many proposed standards will be 
viewed favorably by some clients and negatively by others. While it is important to 
understand the basis for concerns others may have about a proposed standard, and 
to give appropriate thought to those views, our positions reflect the independent 
view of our Firm and not merely a consensus o f the views of many diverse 
interests.
There are different ways to translate that type o f policy into action. Arthur Andersen & 
Co., for example, has had a recognized tradition o f developing a consistent and well- 
regarded body of firm-wide professional positions along with the courage to defend those 
positions even if they are unpopular. Some attribute that tradition to the firm’s own 
“conceptual fr amework” o f financial reporting. Others cite a “tone at the top”— a 
willingness to defend what the firm believes is the best answer for users o f financial 
statements even in the face o f organized preparer opposition. Whatever the cause, the 
result is worthy o f emulation.
The Panel recognizes that the SECPS peer-review process expressly includes a review of 
the firm’s internal controls over its technical accounting consultation function. A firm’s 
process for developing firm positions on technical accounting and auditing standards 
matters is more difficult to review. The POB and the SECPS should consider whether the 
POB’s oversight or the peer review process can be strengthened in this regard. Through 
its oversight of the peer review process, the POB should identify effective policies 
and procedures th a t accounting firms have adopted for internal technical 
consultation, for providing technical guidance to professional staff, and for 
developing firm positions on technical standards. The POB should encourage 
adoption of those " best practices.”
Strengthening the Relationship Between the 
Board of Directors and the Independent Auditor
Responsibilities of Boards of Directors
One important result o f the litigation stemming fr om the corporate takeovers and business 
failures o f the 1980s has been the rise in power o f corporate boards o f directors and a 
growing recognition by large institutional shareholders o f their obligation (and power) to 
monitor diligently the performance o f boards o f directors as the shareholders’ elected 
representatives. Judicial decisions were the principal catalyst for those changes, with 
added impetus from several legislative and regulatory initiatives. Over the past decade, 
the dominance of the process o f corporate governance by management has ebbed as
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boards o f directors have assumed the long-acknowledged but seldom-practiced role as 
“the fulcrum o f accountability” in the corporate governance system.
Ira Millstein (Senior Partner at the law firm o f Weil, Gotshal & Manges and a nationally 
recognized expert on corporate governance) has described the new challenge to the board 
under the evolving governance system as follows:
The board’s challenge is to stay sufficiently informed o f current 
performance, to be concerned with the future o f even apparently great companies, 
to know when it is time to change, and to be sufficiently independent to make the 
change.
Additionally, CEOs should recognize that the best defense against 
shareholder misunderstanding—which today is a serious threat to a CEO’s 
tenure—is the existence o f a strong independent board. This board must be in a 
position to “certify” to shareholders— especially institutional shareholders—that 
the CEO is evaluated regularly, and is doing what the board expects, according to 
a strategic plan agreed to in advance by the board and the CEO.
A similar point o f view has been expressed by Martin Lipton (Partner at the law firm of 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz) and Jay W. Lorsch (Senior Associate Dean o f the 
Graduate School o f Business Administration, Harvard University), also nationally 
recognized experts in corporate governance:
Corporate governance in the United States is not working the way it 
should. The problem is not the system of laws, regulations, and judicial decisions 
which are the fr amework o f corporate governance. It is the failure by too many 
boards o f directors to make the system work the way it should....
This state o f affairs suggests clearly to us that more effective corporate 
governance depends vitally on strengthening the role of the board o f directors.
Lipton and Lorsch cite lack o f time, unwieldy board size, complexity o f information, lack 
of cohesiveness, the power of top management, and confused accountabilities as the 
principal “constraints on the board’s role as an effective monitor.” They make a number 
o f proposals that companies could adopt unilaterally and in their own self-interest, without 
regulation or legislation, including a ratio o f at least two outside directors for each 
management director, reduced board size, increased frequency and duration of meetings, 
improved information, a program for regular evaluation o f corporate performance and that 
o f the CEO, and regular meetings with groups of institutional shareholders. All o f those 
recommendations are intended to strengthen the accountability o f the board to the 
shareholders.
In some companies, the chairman o f the board of directors is an independent 
nonmanagement director. In most companies, though, the chairman is also the chief
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executive officer of the company, a member of management. Two evolving trends in the 
governance o f companies whose board chairman is also the CEO are (1) more frequent 
meetings o f the outside directors without the presence o f any insiders and (2) the 
identification o f an outside director as “lead director”—to serve as the leader of the 
outside directors and as their liaison with the CEO on matters in which the outside 
directors may have a special interest, such as what information the outside directors 
receive and the agenda of board meetings. The Panel endorses the lead-director idea not 
only to bolster independence o f directors and board committees but also to provide a link 
between the independent auditor and the outside directors on matters that the auditor 
believes should be considered by a larger group o f nonmanagement directors than only 
those serving on the audit committee. Strengthening the independence of the outside 
directors should reinforce the objectivity and independence o f the auditor.
The Panel urges the Public Oversight Board, the SEC, and others to encourage the 
adoption of proposals, such as those cited above, to enhance the independence of 
boards of directors and their accountability to shareholders. Stronger, more 
accountable boards will strengthen the professionalism of the outside auditor, 
enhance the value of the independent audit, and serve the investing public.
Role of the Board and Its Audit Committee
Today, in most companies, the auditor’s interaction with the board o f directors is through 
the board’s audit committee. The audit committee assists the board in fulfilling its 
oversight responsibilities in the areas of financial reporting, internal controls, financial 
policies, and the independent and internal audit processes. While it is certainly appropriate 
and effective for the board to delegate those responsibilities to the audit committee, the 
Panel believes that the auditors can add to the effectiveness o f the board in monitoring 
corporate performance on behalf o f the shareholders without detracting fr om the 
important role o f audit committees by direct involvement with the full board and 
particularly its independent directors.
The importance o f the role o f audit committees is well documented. For over 50 years, 
the SEC has recommended that companies form audit committees o f independent 
directors— a recommendation that the Panel believes is even more important today. The 
SEC strengthened that recommendation during the 1970s with required disclosure in 
proxy materials o f the existence, composition, and responsibilities of those committees. A 
number o f “blue ribbon” studies not only in the United States but also in Canada and the 
United Kingdom have made recommendations to strengthen the functioning of audit 
committees. And the POB Special Report made three specific recommendations with 
respect to audit committees (recommendations V-9, V-10, and V-11, set forth in 
Appendix A).
A comprehensive study, Improving Audit Committee Performance: What Works Best, 
that was prepared last year for the Institute o f Internal Auditors, identified organizational
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and operating practices that enable audit committees to function more effectively. 
study noted:
The
Highly publicized frauds and business failures involving the culpability of 
executive management have raised questions about the adequacy o f corporate 
governance. The credibility of financial reporting is also being questioned. It is 
important for all parties involved in the financial reporting process to help close the 
credibility gap by reexamining their roles in the process. Audit committees play a 
key role in assuring the credibility o f financial reporting by providing, on behalf o f 
the board o f directors, oversight o f the financial reporting process as well as 
internal controls. It is vital, therefore, that they function effectively. [page 1]
The report notes that the effectiveness o f audit committees is affected, first and foremost, 
by the expertise o f members o f audit committees in the areas o f accounting and financial 
reporting, internal controls, and auditing:
The single most important finding, and the key to audit committee 
effectiveness, is background information and training. Audit committee members 
must be provided with more background and training to enable them to be more 
effective. Management, internal auditors, and independent accountants are 
identified as sources o f this information. [page 2]
The Panel recognizes that time availability and committee members’ backgrounds 
constrain what an audit committee can do. For that reason, the Panel would not 
encourage that specific responsibilities be placed on audit committees through legislation 
or regulation (such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act o f 
19913 or the legislation recently proposed that would establish audit committee 
responsibility to investigate financial derivatives transactions). Legislated responsibilities 
would tend to make the audit committee compliance-oriented rather than shareholder- 
oriented. Instead of legislating how audit committees should function, the Panel 
would place responsibility on the independent aud ito r to be more forthcoming in 
com m unicating first with the aud it committee and then with the full board.
The Panel believes it essential that the full board and particularly the independent directors 
have more exposure to the outside auditor to assist the board in meeting its responsibilities 
to shareholders. The independent auditor can provide the board a wide and objective
3The Panel finds troublesome certain provisions of that Act that impose specific auditing and reporting 
procedures on independent auditors of insured banks and impose specific duties on audit committees. The 
Panel acknowledges that those provisions of the law were well intentioned but is concerned that imposing 
auditing and reporting procedures and board responsibilities by law can undermine the professionalism 
and independent judgments of outside auditors and boards of directors by making the audit function 
compliance oriented. The Panel is also concerned that this might be “the camel’s nose under the tent” 
with regard to legislating auditing and reporting procedures and board responsibilities.
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perspective o f the company’s operations as well as its financial reporting policies and 
practices.
As the shareholders’ representative, the board is accountable to them for 
monitoring the com pany’s perform ance in achieving its goals and plans. That 
accountability is discharged, in part, by ensuring th a t shareholders receive relevant 
and reliable financial information about the company perform ance and financial 
position."4 The board should expect the auditor to assist it in discharging th a t 
responsibility to the shareholders, and the auditor should assume the obligation to 
do so. Therefore, the full board needs to have direct exposure to the auditors a t 
least once a year p rior to reappointm ent of the auditor.
The involvement o f the auditor with the full board of directors is not intended in any way 
to bypass the audit committee or to replicate the committee’s work at the full board level. 
The committee would continue to review with the auditors the details o f the company’s 
financial statements, management’s discussion and analysis [MD&A], other financial data 
and systems, and audit findings and judgments related thereto. It is the intention o f the 
Panel’s suggestions that audit committees would report the auditor’s views at meetings o f 
the full board and would ask the auditor to be present at such meetings as frequently as 
necessary, but at least once a year.
The audit committee should:
• expect the auditor, as an expert in accounting and financial reporting, to express 
independent judgm ents about the appropriateness, not ju st acceptability, of the 
accounting principles5 and the clarity of the financial disclosure practices used or 
proposed to be adopted by the company;
• hear directly from the auditors on w hether m anagement’s choices of accounting 
principles are conservative, m oderate, o r extreme from the perspective of 
income, asset, and liability recognition, and w hether those principles are 
common practices or are m inority practices;
• be informed of the aud ito r’s reasoning in determining the appropriateness of 
changes in accounting principles and disclosure practices;
4Relevance and reliability are identified as the two key qualities of financial information in FASB 
Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics o f Accounting Information. The opening sentence 
of the November 1993 report, The Information Needs o f  Investors and Creditors, of the AICPA Special 
Committee on Financial Reporting (Jenkins Committee), states: “Investment and credit decision making 
based on information that is less than timely, relevant and reliable inevitably leads to unfu lfilled 
expectations about financial reporting and less effective capital markets.”
5As noted earlier in this report, accounting principles include not only broad guidelines of general 
application but also detailed practices and procedures for implementing them.
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• be informed of the aud ito r’s reasoning in determining the appropriateness of the 
accounting principles and disclosure practices adopted by m anagem ent for new 
transactions or events;
• be informed of the aud ito r’s reasoning in accepting or questioning significant 
estimates made by management;
• be informed of and discuss the appropriateness of all new accounting principles 
and disclosure practices on a timely basis;
• discuss w ith the auditor how the company’s choices of accounting principles and 
disclosure practices may affect shareholders and public views and attitudes 
about the company; and
• review the aud ito r’s fees to insure th a t they are appropriate for the services they 
render.
The auditors’ reviews with the audit committee and with the full board a t least once 
a  year would help provide a basis for the committee to recommend to the board, and 
for the board to recommend to the shareholders, the appointm ent o r ratification of 
the aud ito r for the new fiscal year.6
Responsibilities of Auditors to the Board
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co., the Supreme Court o f the United States 
concluded that the independent public accountant “owes ultimate allegiance to the 
corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This ‘public 
watchdog’ function demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the 
client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.”
While “public watchdog” is an apt description of the auditor’s public interest 
responsibility, the Panel does not believe that it is useful or workable, for purposes of 
defining the auditor-client relationship, to say that “the public” is the auditor’s true client. 
Nor is it practical for “the shareholders” to be the auditor’s client, though clearly, as noted 
by the FASB in its conceptual framework, investors and creditors are the key user groups 
to whom corporate financial reports are directed and, therefore, the principal beneficiaries 
o f the audit.
6Though not a specific legal requirement, it is a widespread practice among publicly traded companies to 
ask shareholders to approve the selection of independent auditors or to ratify the prior approval by the 
board of directors. The proxy rules do require disclosure, in proxy statements for annual shareholders’ 
meetings, of the identity of the auditing firm proposed for the current year, a change of auditor from the 
prior year and whether such change was approved by the board or audit committee, disagreements with 
the auditor, and whether representatives of the current and prior year auditing firm will attend the annual 
meeting.
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Unfortunately, the auditor’s public responsibility can be undermined when financial 
management becomes the primary intermediary between corporations and auditing firms. 
As one observer noted, financial management has, at times, “captured the auditors.” That 
situation should be changed. By no means is the Panel advocating that the auditor-client 
relationship become adversarial. On the other hand, too close a relationship between the 
auditor and management can inhibit independent judgments.
In most companies today, management selects or recommends auditors and changes in 
auditors, negotiates fees, guides the audit, prepares the financial statements, selects 
accounting principles, and makes estimates. Clearly, a smooth working relationship 
between auditor and management is important, but there is a downside. Too close a 
relationship can discourage the auditor from speaking up if the auditor questions the 
accounting principles selected, the clarity o f disclosures, or the estimates and judgments 
made by management. Such a relationship can inhibit or foreclose the auditor from openly 
communicating with the board of directors or audit committee.
The Panel believes that it is essential for the accounting profession to bring greater 
clarity to the issue of who is the auditor’s client. The board of directors, as the 
representative of the shareholders, should be the client, not corporate management. 
Boards, particularly independent directors, and auditors are, or should be, natural 
allies in protecting shareholder interests. The auditor should be brought into the 
mainstream of corporate governance.
The trend in corporate governance is to hold the board more accountable to shareholders 
and management more accountable to the board. Clarifying the role o f auditors in helping 
the board exercise its responsibility would place the management-auditor relationship back 
in balance. Shareholders and boards should expect auditors to challenge management’s 
views on accounting principles, disclosure practices, and accounting estimates and to 
inform the board about how shareholders’ interests are affected by management’s 
accounting choices within the range o f acceptable practice.
Independent auditors have not played a forceful role in assessing and communicating 
about the clarity o f the disclosures and the appropriateness o f the accounting principles 
adopted and estimates made by their clients. Independent CPAs are licensed as 
auditors and experts on accounting and financial control matters. They should be 
willing to express their views as experts to the audit committee and the full board of 
directors about the appropriateness of the accounting principles and financial 
disclosure practices used or proposed to be adopted by the company and, 
particularly, about the degree of aggressiveness or conservatism of the company’s 
accounting principles and underlying estimates and the relevance and reliability of 
the resulting information for investment, credit, and similar decisions.
Several o f the foregoing recommendations entail discussion o f accounting principles by the 
auditors with the audit committee and the full board. In making those recommendations, 
the Panel is not addressing the nature or degree o f detail o f the formal guidance that
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should be provided for making accounting choices and accounting estimates or whether 
the range o f choices should be limited. Those are matters for the accounting standard 
setters. Nor are the Panel’s recommendations intended to change, in any way, the 
auditor’s obligation to speak out if it is the auditor’s professional judgment that a chosen 
accounting principle or estimate is outside the bounds of acceptable practice.
What the Panel is seeking is an open dialog between the members o f the board and the 
auditor regarding the particular choice that was made within the range of  acceptable 
practice—how that choice affects the relevance and reliability o f the company’s reported 
financial data and, ultimately, how that choice affects the shareholder and public views and 
attitudes about the company.
U nder the Panel’s approach, the aud ito r would not only evaluate the company’s 
compliance with generally accepted accounting principles but also express, to the 
aud it committee and the board of directors, a qualitative judgm ent about the 
com pany’s choices of principles, disclosures, and estimates. For years, the auditing 
standards have required the auditor to judge w hether the accounting principles 
selected and applied are “appropriate in the circumstances.” The standard  to which 
the aud ito r has been held in making th a t judgm ent has been w hether the selected 
principle falls within the range of acceptable practice. The Panel would hold the 
aud ito r to a different standard in communicating with the board of directors.
The Panel also believes tha t the audit committee, the board, and the auditor need to 
have an earlier involvement in accounting questions than  is often the case today. 
Management should recognize its obligation to bring new transactions and proposed new 
accounting policies to the attention o f the auditors, the audit committee, and the board 
while they are being contemplated, not after the fact or after financial information based 
on those transactions or policies has been released publicly. Candid discussion between 
management and the auditors may lead to complete agreement about the most appropriate 
practices to recommend to the board or may, in some cases, define differing views of 
management and the auditing firm. In making this suggestion, the Panel does not intend 
to imply that any changes in auditing standards for field work or reporting are needed but, 
rather, simply wishes to encourage more timely, more frequent, and more open 
communication between the board and the auditor.7
The Panel’s suggestions are intended to help the board o f directors fulfill its 
responsibilities to the shareholders—responsibilities in which the board and the
A possible exception relates to Section 380 of the current auditing standards, which requires 
communication to the audit committee “about the process used by management in formulating particularly 
sensitive accounting estimates and about the basis for the auditor’s conclusions regarding the 
reasonableness of those estimates” (AU 380.08). There is no comparable requirement for reporting on the 
rationale for and the auditor’s conclusions regarding “the initial selection of and changes in significant 
accounting policies or their application” (AU 380.07). While most of the suggestions that the Panel 
makes in this report are in the form of encouragement and expectation-building rather than proposed rule 
changes, if the Panel's suggestions about expanding the auditor's responsibilities to the Board are adopted, 
it may be appropriate to modify Section 380 accordingly.
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independent auditor have a coincidence o f interest—and are not in any way intended to 
suggest that auditors usurp the responsibilities o f directors or management.
Greater involvement by all board members with the auditors would have a salutary effect 
o f insuring that firms are likely to elevate the quality o f the people they assign to the 
account, and it would offer the board an independent view of the company’s accounting 
choices, internal controls, and, if warranted, business operations.
Moreover, the broader responsibilities that the Panel would impose on auditors would 
make appointing the auditor more than a routine, symbolic act. Those responsibilities 
would acknowledge that the board expects the auditor to take an active role in overseeing 
and strengthening the company’s financial reporting process. And they would make clear 
that the board’s decision on auditor reappointment will be based on how well the auditor 
has helped the board to fulfill its responsibility to protect shareholder interests. Assisting 
the board in its fiduciary mission is the essence of the auditor’s own obligation to 
the public— and the hallm ark of the auditor’s professionalism.
The A uditor’s Evaluation of the Appropriateness of 
Accounting Principles. Disclosure Practices, and Estimates
Recommendations V-6, V-7, and V-8 in the March 1993 POB Special Report would seem 
to hold auditors to a higher standard than “falling within a range of acceptable limits” in 
evaluating the appropriateness o f accounting policies. The Panel’s recommendation that 
auditors express their expert views to the audit committee and, in summary, to the board 
o f directors about the appropriateness o f the company’s  accounting principles and 
underlying estimates and the clarity o f the related financial disclosure practices is 
consistent with the objective o f those POB recommendations. However, the Panel would 
go a bit further.
Recommendations V-6 and V-8 focus only on an accounting principle adopted for a new 
kind o f transaction or event and would impose a special duty on the auditor and, 
separately, on the “concurring partner” to be satisfied that the new accounting principle 
properly reflects the economic substance o f the transaction in accordance with basic 
concepts o f financial reporting. Recommendation V-7 suggests that peer reviewers not 
only should evaluate the consultation process by which a firm’s technical office reaches 
specific accounting conclusions but also “should inquire whether that process leads to 
accounting that is appropriate in the circumstances [and] evaluate the quality o f the 
conclusions reached.”
Recommendations in the POB Special Report would, in effect, ask the audit committee to 
judge (V-9) and opine (V-10) on the appropriateness o f all of a company’s accounting 
principles, not just those for new transactions and events.
The Panel agrees with the POB’s objectives in Recommendations V-6 through V-10, but 
the Panel would achieve those objectives by making the auditor more proactive rather than
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reactive and by making it explicit that disclosure practices, and the clarity thereof, are 
integral to relevant and reliable financial information.
The Panel would place the initial burden on the auditor, rather than the audit 
committee, to judge the appropriateness, not Just the acceptability, of a company’s 
accounting principles. In fact, the Panel has reservations about requiring public 
reporting by audit committees regarding the appropriateness o f the company’s 
accounting principles, as POB Recommendation V-10 suggests. Further, the Panel 
would place the burden on the auditor to discuss with the audit committee the 
clarity of disclosure practices and the appropriateness and effect of the accounting 
estimates made by management. Finally, the auditor should assume responsibility 
to evaluate not only the appropriateness of an accounting principle proposed for a 
new type of transaction or event but also the continuing appropriateness of old 
accounting principles. As suggested earlier in this report, the audit committee and 
the board of directors should expect the auditor to assume those responsibilities.
The Panel’s objective is not to narrow the range of acceptable accounting practices for a 
particular kind o f transaction or event (that may follow in due course) but to encourage 
open communication with the audit committee and the board o f directors about new as 
well as ongoing policies and the professional auditor’s expert views thereon. The 
expectation that auditors will express their expert views to the committee and the board 
will enhance their objectivity in considering management’s chosen practices—both 
principles and estimates.
The Panel is hopeful that expecting auditors to judge and communicate to the audit 
committee and the board the appropriateness o f accounting principles and practices may 
discourage the auditing profession from seeking authoritative “bright line” guidance for 
every accounting and auditing question that arises. The independent audit is in danger o f 
becoming totally rule-driven and compliance-oriented. The search for “bright lines” is a 
symptom o f a problem, not a solution. Auditors often ask standard setters for rules that 
enable the auditor to draw lines with clients and not run the risk o f a competitor not 
drawing the same line. The SEC S ta ff Report on Auditor Independence acknowledges the 
SEC’s own push for “simple, bright-line accounting principles and auditing standards.” 
Standards, no matter how detailed, should be regarded as a framework or constraints 
within which professional judgment should be exercised; they are not a substitute for that 
judgment.
Accounting firms have procedures for providing guidance to practice partners and staff in 
difficult or unusual accounting situations. Some firms have written policies setting forth 
the firm’s own view as to the “best” or “preferred” or “appropriate” accounting practice. 
Those procedures and policies can be the basis for supporting the auditor in 
communicating with the board about the appropriateness o f accounting principles. 
Knowing that they will have to communicate about accounting principles, disclosure 
practices, and estimates to the audit committee and the full board o f directors will be
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further impetus for the firms’ technical offices to develop procedures and policies to assist 
partners in making qualitative judgments.
The Panel’s suggestions for enhancing the value of the independent audit to the board are 
consistent with one of the key conclusions at a special 1993 Audit/Assurance Conference 
jointly sponsored by the AICPA and the Big 6 accounting firms;
The conference participants... concluded that the assurance function should 
place a renewed emphasis on meeting user needs. That function should be 
redefined and expanded to (1) focus on a wider array o f information and 
information processes, (2) provide a means for auditors to provide their own 
qualitative comments and add to the information presented, and (3) evaluate the 
relevance o f the information presented.
That conference led to the recent appointment by the AICPA Board o f Directors o f a 
Special Committee on Assurance Services that will critically examine auditing and related 
assurance services in the same way as the AICPA Special Committee on Financial 
Reporting (Jenkins Committee) is examining the information needs o f users of financial 
reports. The Panel encourages those and other efforts currently under way within the 
accounting profession to improve the usefulness o f accounting data and the value of the 
independent audit. The Panel encourages the POB to prod the profession to follow 
through on implementation of those efforts.
The Panel’s suggestion that auditors report to the board on the appropriateness and 
aggressiveness o f accounting principles is not without potential dangers. One undesirable 
result could be “opinion shopping” among accounting firms. While the common starting 
point from which all would assess appropriateness should be the relevance and reliability 
o f the resulting information, the Panel recognizes that other accounting firms or even 
management might think differently from the auditor. One commentator referred to such 
differences o f opinion as “creative tension” between management and the auditors, which 
the Panel regards as healthy by alerting the board to the choices the corporation has and 
the merits o f alternative courses o f action.
With the right atmosphere— directors recognizing their responsibilities and auditors 
fulfilling theirs—the result will be a forthright interchange of professional views, 
thereby giving directors a better basis for influencing corporate practices. However, 
that right atmosphere can be quickly dissipated if directors do not encourage 
auditors’ forthrightness and, if necessary, discourage any management efforts to 
inhibit the auditor. Some corporate boards might not welcome auditor 
forthrightness, but that does not relieve the auditor of what the Panel believes is— or 
should be— an overriding professional responsibility always to express an objective, 
expert judgment even if not welcomed.
Another potential problem is that the SEC might look on the auditor’s forthright 
discussion as leverage to force changes in principles, disclosures, or estimates. That
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would defeat the Panel’s objective. If it is the auditor’s view that the client’s accounting is 
“acceptable” but “liberal” or “aggressive” or not the “most appropriate,” the SEC should 
not insist that such observations are a basis for forcing the registrant to change 
accounting. The SEC must foster the auditor’s professionalism. The SEC must recognize 
that the auditor’s professional judgment may differ from that o f management, another 
firm, and, indeed, the SEC. The SEC should encourage boards o f directors to consider 
the auditor’s viewpoint together with that of management and take whatever action they 
deem in the best interests of the shareholders.
The Panel’s Suggestions Are a Three-Part Package
In sum m ary, the Panel’s suggestions for strengthening the relationship between the 
board of directors and the auditor are a three-p a rt package. All three steps are 
needed to ensure th a t the company’s financial reports meet the shareholders’ need 
for relevant and reliable information. (1) The board must recognize the primacy of 
its accountability to shareholders. (2) The aud ito r m ust look to the board of 
directors as the client. (3) The board m ust expect and the auditor must deliver 
candid communication about the appropriateness, not ju s t acceptability, of 
accounting principles and estimates and the clarity of the related disclosures of 
financial information th a t the company reports publicly.
A re Additional Public Reports Needed?
A number o f proposals have been made recently for additional reports detailing the roles 
and relationships between the auditors, the board, the audit committee, and/or 
management to be included in proxy materials or annual reports. Examples of the 
proposed reports include the Treadway Commission’s recommendation that the annual 
report include a letter from the audit committee describing its responsibilities and 
activities; Recommendation V-10 in the POB Special Report proposing a similarly detailed 
statement from the audit committee; Recommendation II-1 in the POB Special Report that 
the SEC require registrants to disclose whether the auditors have had a peer review and its 
results; Recommendation V-12 in the POB Special Report that the SEC require registrants 
to include, with the annual financial statements, separate reports by management and the 
independent accountant on the effectiveness o f the company’s internal control system 
relating to financial reporting; and the various reports mandated for banks by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act o f 1991 (which include reports on 
internal control, compliance with laws and regulations, and reviews o f interim financial 
statements).
The Panel is concerned that these additional reports can become lengthy “boilerplate” that 
does not get to the heart of the underlying issue o f strengthening auditor accountability   
Instead of the lengthier proposed reports, the Panel would encourage a simple 
statem ent in the proxy tha t the board meets a t least annually with its auditors to 
obtain their observations, review their perform ance, and set the terms of their 
engagement.
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Relationship among Auditors, Standard Setters, and the SEC8
Because they share common objectives w ith respect to the public interest, there 
must be more cooperative, less adversarial relationships among the public 
accounting profession, the standard  setters, and the SEC. The main goal of all should 
be to reflect in financial statements the most useful information about the business 
transactions and events occurring during the reporting period.
The working relationships among the accounting profession, the standard setters, and the 
SEC have been damaged and need to be repaired. Evidence o f that damage includes the 
speeches by the Chief Accountant o f the SEC cited earlier, actions by the large public 
accounting firms in connection with the FASB’s project on accounting for stock-based 
compensation (characterized by the Chief Accountant as possible “cheerleading” for their 
clients), and the SEC’s effort to establish accounting standards on accrual o f restructuring 
costs through the minutes of the FASB Emerging Issues Task Force.
The auditors, standard setters, and the SEC all have an interest in improved financial 
reporting. Though the three groups have distinct roles in the corporate financial reporting 
process, their mutual concern for the public interest requires that they communicate, treat 
each other with respect, and cooperate in the standard-setting process. Only more 
cooperative relationships and the give and take o f professional discussions can bring these 
groups together to assure prompt and thoughtful improvements in financial reporting.
Responsibilities of Accounting Firms in the Standard-Setting Process
Earlier in this report, the Panel noted ways in which the firms’ professionalism in dealing 
with standard setters might be enhanced. Those enhancements are particularly important 
since efforts to influence the outcome o f FASB deliberations have become much more 
organized and effective in recent years.
Until the past few years, accounting firms and business enterprises, for the most part, put 
forth their views individually. More and more, group responses are prepared (some 
groups are organized solely for one FASB project and some written responses look like 
political petitions), and commentators disseminate their views widely in the hope of 
influencing others. Even corporate chief executive officers have a hand in developing and 
espousing accounting positions. The most aggressive lobbying effort ever is currently 
taking place in opposition to the FASB’s proposal to require that compensation expense
8In the course of its study, the Panel interviewed and received written input from representatives of the 
SEC and several banking regulators. Those interviews and communications were helpful to the Panel in 
gaining insights into issues affecting auditors’ objectivity, integrity, and independence. The observations 
in this section of the Panel’s report concentrate on the auditor’s relationships with the SEC and the 
accounting standard setters, though some of our observations may also be applicable to relationships with 
other regulators.
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be recognized in the income statement for the estimated fair value o f stock options granted 
to employees.
The Big 6 senior partners now meet regularly and are a natural target for those lobbying 
activities. We understand that those meetings are occasionally with representatives o f The 
Business Roundtable. While there may be legitimate reason for those senior partners to 
meet and to communicate publicly on issues affecting the profession as a whole, 
communicating a single view in jointly signed letters on accounting for stock 
compensation, first on February 17, 1993, before an FASB Exposure Draft was issued, 
and then again on July 15, 1994 after meeting with representatives o f The Business 
Roundtable, gives the appearance o f trying to impress the FASB with clout rather than 
reasoning. Those letters are being used by lobbyists and cannot help but create the 
impression that those senior partners and the firms they represent have responded both to 
peer pressure and to pressure from organized business groups that include the firms’ major 
clients.
The perception problem in the stock compensation matter is accentuated by the fact that 
the firms’ joint position in the 1993 and 1994 letters differed fr om that taken in a 1984 
letter to the FASB fr om AcSEC. That letter urged the FASB to undertake the project 
and to make a “major change” by recognizing compensation cost based on a measure o f 
the “minimum value” o f an option at the grant date, and many o f the firms themselves had 
expressed similar views to the FASB. Clearly, over time a firm may change its view on a 
technical accounting issue without being guilty o f subordination o f professional judgment. 
In the stock compensation case, the firms whose views changed explained those changes 
in submissions to the FASB during the intervening period.   However, to be considered 
independent in matters o f accounting principle, the Big 6 accounting firms should go to 
great lengths to avoid the appearance o f being unduly influenced by clients or exerting 
undue pressure on the FASB. Even the appearance o f such behavior can undermine the 
public’s respect for the profession.
The Big 6 senior partners should recognize that joint actions instigated by them or jointly 
approved by them, particularly those impacting on the standard setting process, just 
reopen the door for the conspiracy theories investigated by Congressional committees in 
the mid-1970s (see, for example, The Accounting Establishment, a 1,760 page staff study 
prepared by a Senate subcommittee, which criticized the SEC for “delegating its public 
authority and responsibilities on accounting matters to private groups with obvious self- 
interests in the resolution o f such matters” and “the alarming lack o f independence and 
lack o f dedication to public protection shown by the large accounting firms.”) For 
reasons o f public perception, the Panel believes th a t communications to the FASB 
(or o ther standard  setters) on accounting policies should not come jointly from the 
Big 6. Individual firms and duly constituted committees of professional 
organizations such as the AICPA are the appropriate vehicles for communicating 
with s tandard  setters.
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F urther, individual firms should be careful in how they communicate the ir views to 
the ir clients and the public a t large. Selective or unusually wide distribution of those 
views, particularly when the firm opposes a proposed action o f standard setters, can easily 
be read as resulting from client pressure or unprofessional lobbying by the firm. 
Moreover, actions o f this sort are transparent and are seen by the standard setters, the 
regulators, and the investing public as an indication that the business community has 
captured the public accounting profession.
Responsibilities of the Standard Setters in the Private Sector
The standard setters should be committed to setting standards that will result in the most 
useful— that is, relevant and reliable—information in the financial statements. For the 
FASB and AcSEC that means never to lose sight of the primacy o f relevance and 
reliability in their decision process. In the case o f the Auditing Standards Board it means 
standards that increase the likelihood that the financial statements are free from material 
misstatement.
Standard setters should be committed to addressing and resolving issues on a timely basis. 
While the SEC certainly cannot dictate the FASB’s agenda, there should be a presumption 
that an accounting issue called to the FASB’s attention by the SEC Chief Accountant 
warrants careful and timely consideration. The FASB itself needs to be more aggressive in 
bringing issues to the table for discussion.
Responsibilities of the SEC
Enforcing accounting and auditing standards is a separate matter from establishing those 
standards. Enforcement is clearly the SEC’s bailiwick, not the FASB’s or the EITF’s or 
AcSEC’s or the Auditing Standards Board’s. In the area o f setting accounting and 
auditing standards, the SEC’s principal focus should involve constructive assistance to 
those and other private-sector professional groups in their efforts to resolve complex 
questions. The SEC should be a standard setter o f last resort, acting only if the profession 
is unable to do what is necessary in a timely fashion and, even then, only after appropriate 
due process. Recently, some SEC accounting guidelines have been announced in speeches 
or comments at public meetings rather than through formal Staff Accounting Bulletins or 
rule-making, and accountants in public practice and industry have nicknamed them “turbo- 
SABs.”
The links between the SEC and the various standard-setting bodies already are in place to 
enable the SEC to provide the constructive assistance that the Panel envisions. However, 
in the judgment o f the Panel, some adjustments are needed—to replace what some view as 
impatience and second-guessing on the part o f the SEC (OCA and the Division of 
Corporation Finance) with tolerance and respect.
The Panel believes that a better dialog should take place between the SEC and the 
profession when a firm or a registrant wishes to propose a new or different accounting
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treatment. There is need for restraint and balance. Advocacy or acceptance o f a practice 
should not be publicly labeled as “incredible” unless it has resulted in an ethics action or a 
Rule 2(e) proceeding.
The SEC must also recognize that, on occasion, an accounting firm may support a 
registrant’s request that the SEC regard a particular accounting principle or disclosure 
practice as acceptable even though the accounting firm may have expressed a preference 
for a different principle or practice in earlier discussions with the registrant’s board of 
directors and management. As the Panel noted earlier, the SEC should not use the 
auditor’s frank discussions with the board o f directors as leverage against the registrant. 
I f  the Panel’s suggestions for strengthening the relationship between the board and the 
auditor are implemented, the number of these situations should decline.
The EITF
The FASB established its Emerging Issues Task Force in 1984 to help the Board identify 
emerging accounting issues and problems in implementing authoritative pronouncements. 
EITF members include the senior technical partners o f major national and regional public 
accounting firms as well as representatives o f major associations o f preparers, such as the 
Financial Executives Institute, The Business Roundtable, and the Institute o f Management 
Accountants. The SEC’s Chief Accountant and a member of the AICPA’s Accounting 
Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC) also participate.
The composition o f the EITF is designed to include persons in a position to be aware o f 
emerging issues before divergent accounting practices become entrenched. The 
participation o f the SEC Chief Accountant is important to the process o f the EITF. Often, 
EITF agenda issues are problems that have been identified by the SEC as a result o f the 
securities registration and annual reporting process. And the Chief Accountant’s 
involvement is strong impetus for a private-sector self-imposed solution to a problem.
The EITF meets approximately six times a year and publishes a record o f its proceedings. 
Often, as a result o f discussing an issue at an EITF meeting, the group reaches a general 
consensus on appropriate accounting practice, which the FASB can usually take as an 
indication that no Board action is needed. On the other hand, the inability o f the group to 
reach a consensus may be an indication that action by the FASB is necessary.
Most observers regard the EITF’s first ten years as successful in identifying emerging 
problems and reaching solutions to most o f them that are “acceptable” to the both the 
FASB and SEC, avoiding the need for FASB Interpretations and Technical Bulletins or 
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletins.
Critical to the work o f the EITF are leadership o f the FASB, the willingness of public 
accounting firms to identify and resolve problems, and restraint and constructive 
assistance by the SEC. That restraint recently appeared to have broken down, in the view 
o f the Panel, when the Chief Accountant o f the SEC added detailed guidance on
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accounting for restructuring charges to the minutes of an EITF meeting even though the 
EITF had not reached a consensus on that guidance and the guidance had not been stated 
at the meeting.
To foster professionalism, the SEC must m onitor the E ITF process but exercise 
restrain t and let the system work. Simply put, the SEC must recognize that “bright 
lines” may not be apparent to all. I f  the EITF cannot resolve an issue and the SEC cannot 
wait for the FASB, the SEC should follow its process o f rule-making or issuing a Staff 
Accounting Bulletin or other form o f release. The FASB and its EITF should not be used 
as a vehicle for communicating the views o f the SEC that have not been discussed by the 
group following its established processes.
The Panel believes th a t the SEC, through its registration and annual reporting 
process, can and should serve as an early-warning mechanism for the kinds of 
accounting practice problems th a t have been criticized in the media or have been 
classified as “ incredible.” (For example, how did the restructuring issue get so far along 
in its life cycle that it reached crisis proportions before the problem was taken up by 
EITF?) In the environment of mutual trust and cooperation that the Panel envisions, the 
SEC would inform the FASB and its EITF o f the matter and look to them for resolution. 
FASB-EITF would have the obligation to meet on short notice to deal quickly with 
developing problems identified by the SEC or others. With the advent o f increasing 
technology, time has become o f the essence. Certainly, this approach ought to dispose o f 
the fr ivolous and unmeritorious proposals quickly, leaving only a few for more in-depth 
analysis.
The mechanism that the Panel describes is not new. It is in place today. What is missing 
is an attitude o f mutual respect and cooperation and a commitment to resolving 
accounting questions quickly within established procedures.
The FASB has recently formed a committee to review the structure and operation o f the 
EITF now that it has completed its tenth year o f operations. The review will consider the 
EITF’s mission (“to assist the Board in its efforts to provide timely guidance on emerging 
issues and implementation questions,”) whether it is adequately fulfilling that mission, and 
whether the mission should be revised. The review will also consider the EITF’s 
relationship with the FASB, AcSEC, and the SEC as well as procedural matters relating to 
the EITF’s operations. The Panel commends the FASB for undertaking this review.
While the Panel believes that seeking “bright-line” standards and EITF guidance is a 
symptom of the audit function’s slide into a compliance and rule-oriented approach, it is 
also mindful that deciding what is acceptable for purposes o f opining on the fairness o f 
financial statements is the profession’s primary responsibility. The EITF is a good private- 
sector response that fits the present professional environment.
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A Better Legal Environment for Auditor Professionalism
Litigation has had a damaging and costly impact on the profession—and on the public it 
serves—by discouraging new entrants into auditing, by focusing business strategies and 
management efforts within larger firms on nonaudit services entailing lower litigation 
risks, by encouraging a proliferation o f detailed standards to serve as a protection against 
second-guessing by litigants and thereby making audits more compliance and rule-book 
oriented, and by creating an atmosphere in which auditors are reluctant to make 
independent professional judgments.
A better legal and regulatory environment will permit auditors, without fear o f exposure to 
unwarranted and excessive liability, to express their professional judgments to boards o f 
directors as experts in accounting and financial reporting on the matters described earlier 
in this report. Further, a better legal environment would encourage the profession to 
analyze and learn from audit failures. After all, prompt, constructive self-analysis o f 
mistakes is a hallmark o f a profession.
For those reasons, prompt tort reform to reduce accountants' liability is o f vital 
importance to the future o f the profession and its ability to serve the investing public. 
Looking ahead, the efforts now underway in the profession to enhance the value o f the 
attest function and to improve financial reporting may make tort reform and possibly some 
legal or regulatory safe harbors even more important.
Currently under consideration is the “Private Securities Litigation Reform Act o f 1994,” 
introduced in the Congress early in 1994 by Senator Christopher J. Dodd. Under that bill, 
the SEC would create or designate a “Public Accounting Self-Disciplinary Board” to 
register all firms o f independent auditors o f public companies and investigate and 
discipline accounting firms. The bill would also provide certain tort reforms. The AICPA 
and the Big 6 accounting firms are supporting the bill.
The tim e has come for the SEC to take the lead in helping the profession reduce its 
exposure to unw arranted  litigation. The SEC has an enormous stake in the viability 
of the profession. The Commission commands great respect with the Congress and 
w ith the  investing public. In  the Panel’s judgm ent, there are dangers not ju s t to  the 
profession bu t to the investing public if  the current liability situation continues to 
drift w ithout SEC leadership.
Tort reform is necessary but will not be sufficient alone to enhance the integrity, 
objectivity, and professionalism o f the independent auditing function. The Panel believes 
th a t the suggestions in this report can be considered separately from, and need not 
aw ait, legislative action on litigation reform. These suggestions for im proving 
aud ito r professionalism will need the vigorous support of the SEC in helping to 
create the  kind of supportive environm ent described earlier in this report.
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V . C O N C L U S IO N S
The Panel stated at the beginning that the profession is at a critical juncture. While much 
has been done to enhance auditors’ integrity, objectivity, and independence, there are 
fu ndamental developments at work that could over time undermine the independent role 
o f the profession in the private sector. The Panel does not pretend to have detailed 
recommendations offering instant solutions. Rather, the Panel has pointed out the 
underlying issues facing the profession and offered suggestions as to what should be done 
to bring auditing into the mainstream o f corporate governance and to restore auditing to 
its important role in our society. The Panel’s principal conclusions are:
1. There is no need at this time for additional rules, regulations, or legislation dealing 
with the conflict-of-interest aspect o f auditor independence. There are, however, 
important steps that should be taken in other ways to strengthen the professionalism of 
independent auditors.
2. Auditing is different from other services accounting firms render. It imposes 
special and higher responsibilities. Independent auditing firms, regulators, and overseers 
o f the public accounting profession need to focus on how the audit function can be 
enhanced and not submerged in large multi-line public accounting/management consulting 
firms.
3. The Public Oversight Board, the SEC, and others should support proposals to 
enhance the independence of boards o f directors and their accountability to shareholders. 
Stronger, more accountable corporate boards o f directors will strengthen the 
professionalism of the outside auditor, enhance the value of the independent audit, and 
serve the investing public.
4. To increase the value o f the independent audit, corporate boards o f directors and 
their audit committees must hear from independent auditors their views as professional 
advisors on the appropriateness o f the accounting principles used or proposed to be 
adopted by the company, the clarity o f its financial disclosures, and the degree of 
aggressiveness or conservatism of the company’s accounting principles and underlying 
estimates.
5. The accounting profession should look to the representatives o f the shareholders—  
the board o f directors— as the client, not corporate management. Boards and auditors are, 
or should be, natural allies in protecting shareholder interests.
6. Auditors must assume the obligation to communicate qualitative judgments about 
accounting principles, disclosures, and estimates. By doing so, independent auditors can 
add to the effectiveness o f boards o f directors in monitoring corporate performance on
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behalf o f shareholders and in assuring that shareholders receive relevant and reliable 
financial information about company performance and financial condition.
7. By making these suggestions to boards and auditors, the Panel’s objective is not to 
narrow the range o f acceptable accounting practices (that may follow in due course) but to 
give directors a better basis for influencing corporate practices. These suggestions should 
also enhance the objectivity and strengthen the professionalism o f the auditor.
8. Because they share the objective o f providing the public with relevant and reliable 
financial information, the public accounting profession, the standard setters, and the SEC 
must have more cooperative, less adversarial relationships. CPA firms should be careful in 
how they communicate their views to the FASB, the SEC, their clients, and the public at 
large. The SEC should help identify accounting practice problems and look to the private 
sector standard setters to solve them. It should only be a standard setter o f “last resort” 
and then only after appropriate due process.
9. It is urgent that the SEC take the lead in helping the profession to reduce exposure 
to unwarranted litigation. There are dangers, not just to the profession but to the 
investing public, if the current liability situation continues to drift without SEC leadership.
10. While tort reform is necessary, the other suggestions in this report can be 
considered separately from, and need not await, legislative action on litigation reform.
For the future, the Panel believes that the SEC and the POB should consider devoting 
resources to stay informed on a continuing basis about developments in the auditing 
profession and in the market for audit services. As described in this report, some o f those 
developments could materially affect the viability o f the independent audit as a private- 
sector activity. By having the facts, the SEC and the POB will be in a position to 
anticipate and take appropriate steps to strengthen auditor professionalism.
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APPENDIX A
POB 1993 RECOM M ENDATIONS DIRECTLY RELEVANT 
TO TH E W O R K  O F TH E ADVISORY PANEL
Recom m endation V-3
The A ICPA should undertake a  project to sharpen fu rther the distinction between 
client advocacy and client service and incorporate th a t distinction into the 
profession’s Code of Professional Conduct. Individual accounting firms should 
constantly review their program s regarding client advocacy and client service to 
strengthen the desire of each audit partner to protect the firm ’s independence.
Recom m endation V-4
Accounting firms should take special care to ensure th a t the ir participation in the 
s tandard  setting process is characterized by objectivity and professionalism. 
S tandard  setters and  leaders of the profession should discuss and address the issues 
related to client advocacy in the standard  setting process and establish ways of 
identifying and correcting aberran t behavior when it occurs.
Recom m endation V-5
Firm s’ consultation policies and procedures should ensure th a t client accounting 
issues are  not discussed w ith SEC staff w ithout the benefit of consultation a t the 
appropria te  level w ithin the firm.
Recom m endation V-6
The following recom m endation of the M acdonald Commission [of the C anadian 
Institu te  of C hartered  Accountants] should be adopted by the Auditing S tandards 
B oard in the United States:
W hen new accounting policies are adopted in response to new types of 
transactions o r new kinds of assets o r obligations, the auditor should be 
satisfied th a t the accounting policies adopted properly reflect the economic 
substance of the transaction, asset, o r liability in accordance with the  broad 
theory  governing present-day financial reporting and the established concept 
o f conservatism in the face of uncertainty.
Recom m endation V-7
Peer reviewers should evaluate the consultation process by which specific 
accounting conclusions are reached, as they do now, and should also inquire 
w hether th a t process leads to accounting th a t is appropriate in the circumstances. 
In  testing compliance with the consultation policies and procedures in a firm , the 
peer review team  should evaluate the quality of the conclusions reached.
continued...
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APPENDIX A (continued)
Recom m endation V-8
The concurring partner, whose participation in an aud it is a mem bership 
requirem ent of the SEC Practice Section, should be responsible for assuring th a t 
those consulted on accounting m atters are aw are of all o f the  relevant facts and 
circum stances, including an understanding of the financial statem ents in whose 
context the  accounting policy is being considered. The concurring and consulting 
partners  should know enough about the client to ensure th a t all o f the relevant facts 
and circum stances are marshalled, and also possess the increased detachm ent th a t 
comes from  not having to face the client on an ongoing basis. The concurring 
p a rtn e r should have the responsibility to conclude w hether the accounting 
trea tm en t applied is consistent with the objectives of Recom m endation V-6.
Recom m endation V-9
A udit committees (or the board if there is no audit committee) should assume the 
following responsibilities relating to an SEC registran t’s p reparation  of annual 
financial statem ents: (a) review the annual financial statem ents; (b) confer with 
m anagem ent and the independent auditor about them ; (c) receive from the 
independent aud ito r all information tha t the aud ito r is required to communicate 
under auditing standards; (d) assess w hether the financial statem ents are complete 
and  consistent w ith information known to them ; and (e) assess w hether the financial 
statem ents reflect appropriate accounting principles.
Recom m endation V-10
The SEC should require registrants to include in a docum ent containing the annual 
financial statem ents a statem ent by the audit committee (or by the board if there is 
no aud it committee) th a t describes its responsibilities and tells how they were 
discharged. This disclosure should state w hether the audit committee members (or, 
in the absence of an  audit committee, the members of the board): (a) have reviewed 
the  annual financial statements; (b) have conferred with m anagem ent and the 
independent aud ito r about them; (c) have received from  the independent auditor all 
inform ation th a t the auditor is required to communicate under auditing standards; 
(d) believe th a t the financial statem ents are complete and consistent with 
inform ation known to them; and (e) believe th a t the financial statem ents reflect 
approp ria te  accounting principles.
Recom m endation V-11
The aud it committee or the board of directors should be satisfi ed th a t the audit fee 
negotiated by it o r management for the entity’s aud it is sufficient to assure the 
entity will receive a comprehensive and complete audit.
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A P P E N D I X  B
T H E  C H I E F  A C C O U N T A N T ’S 1 9 9 4  S P E E C H
Chief Accountants of the SEC have a long and healthy tradition o f candor with the 
accounting profession, often using professional meetings and conferences to alert the 
profession to important issues. On January 11, 1994 Chief Accountant Walter P. 
Schuetze did that in a speech in which he called into question the independence of 
accounting firms in situations where they condoned “incredible” accounting principles in 
financial statements, or advocated such principles before the staff o f the SEC, or were 
overly influenced by client views in formulating their own positions on subjects under 
scrutiny by the FASB. Mr. Schuetze had made similar charges in an August 1992 speech.
The points made in the January 1994 speech are as follows;
• “Auditors [are] not standing up to their clients on financial accounting and reporting 
issues when their clients take a position that is, at best, not supported in the 
accounting literature or, at worst, directly contrary to existing accounting 
pronouncements.”
• Four specific cases argued before the Chief Accountant are examples o f the national 
offices o f major firms advocating accounting contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, o f 
GAAP.
• There continue to be other “more broadly applicable” cases o f accepted accounting 
practices contrary to accounting literature, such as “funded catastrophe covers” which 
spread the losses from catastrophes rather than recognizing the losses at the time o f 
the catastrophe as required by FASB Statement 5; not updating discount rates used in 
measuring obligations for pensions and healthcare benefits, contrary to the 
requirements o f FASB Statements 87 and 106; and inappropriate accounting for 
investments in debt securities in 1992.
• “CPAs may have become cheerleaders for their clients on the issue o f accounting for 
stock options issued to employees.”
Subsequent to the appointment o f the Panel, the Office o f the Chief Accountant (OCA) 
submitted its S ta ff Report on Auditor Independence (March 1994) to Congressman 
Edward J. Markey in response to his earlier request. The Panel believes the S ta ff Report 
on Auditor Independence puts in their proper context the comments o f Mr. Schuetze 
regarding client advocacy in meetings with the Commission’s staff:
Client Advocacy.
In addition to the numerous independence issues that surround the conduct 
o f an audit, the SEC staff is concerned that certain accounting firms may have 
compromised their objectivity with respect to proposed or actual client accounting 
treatments with the SEC staff. The Commission staff wishes to stress that the 
number o f instances in which questionable client advocacy has been established is 
very small in relation to the number o f audited financial statements filed with the
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Commission. The staff continues to believe that the vast majority o f audits are 
conducted in an appropriate skeptical manner. The staff also appreciates that 
reasonable people may come to different conclusions on accounting issues and, in 
good faith hold and represent views that differ from those o f the staff. The OCA 
encourages registrants and their auditors to discuss and resolve financial 
accounting and reporting issues with the staff. A different situation arises, 
however, when high levels o f authority within major accounting firms appear to 
argue unfounded positions before the staff. Some o f these instances cause the staff 
to question the appearance o f auditor independence. [Footnote omitted.]
The staff believes that these events raise questions about whether the 
auditor has maintained an appropriate relationship to his or her audit client. The 
staff recognizes, however, that the problem o f an appearance o f “client advocacy” 
may not be susceptible to correction through additional, objective independence 
interpretations or rules. The current sanction for this type o f conduct is a possible 
reduction in the credibility before the public on the accounting issues being 
considered. This is a serious sanction, indeed. To prevent such a loss o f 
confidence in a firm’s views, the firm, when accompanying audit clients to 
meetings with the Commission staff or providing written substantiation for the 
proposed accounting should present positions that are well-founded in, or logical 
extensions of, authoritative accounting literature. [Footnote omitted]
The Four Cases
The Panel invited the auditors for each o f the four cases described by Mr. Schuetze as 
“incredible” to  submit a written summary o f the case, including the facts as the accounting 
firm saw them, the accounting issues identified, the positions taken by the company and 
the auditor, the circumstances o f the auditor’s “advocacy” o f the client’s position before 
the SEC. All four auditing firms responded to the Panel’s request.
With the knowledge o f the four auditors, the Panel provided a copy o f the auditors’ 
responses to the Office o f the Chief Accountant o f the SEC, which prepared staff 
memoranda responding to the auditors’ responses.
While Mr. Schuetze’s description o f the four cases as “incredible” was part o f the reason 
that the POB appointed the panel, it is not the purpose o f the Panel to be an arbiter o f who 
was right and who was wrong in each of the four cases or whether they were, in fact, 
incredible. The Panel believes that by concluding that “the number o f instances in which 
questionable client advocacy has been established is very small in relation to the number o f 
audited financial statements filed with the Commission,” the OCA S ta ff Report on Auditor 
Independence removes much o f the sting from the four cases. Also the issues, at least in 
part, do not appear to be as black and white as Mr. Schuetze portrayed them.
There are lessons that can be learned from this incident by both the firms and the 
SEC— lessons that can help achieve the objective o f bolstering the independence,
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objectivity, and integrity o f independent auditors. Those lessons relate to relationships 
and selection and retention o f accounting principles and practices and alertness to changes 
in the business environment.
First, the presence o f a registrant’s auditor at the SEC is not necessarily inappropriate 
behavior by the auditor, even if the auditor has a preference for an accounting principle 
different from that proposed by the registrant. Accounting principles are not natural laws, 
and reasonable people can reach different conclusions on accounting questions. Auditors 
do not always agree with their clients on accounting matters, and the Panel believes that 
an auditor has the expertise and a professional obligation to encourage the client to adopt 
accounting principles that produce the most relevant and reliable financial information. At 
the same time, supporting in a restrained, reasoned, and professional manner a client’s 
position that the independent auditing firm believes is appropriate in the circumstances is 
not advocacy or at least not an unacceptable kind o f advocacy.
Second, as the Panel noted earlier in this report, public accounting firms should adopt 
mechanisms that ensure that their national technical offices are independent o f practice 
partners who feel the direct pressure from client companies; that the standard to which the 
national technical office personnel should be held in advising engagement partners is not 
just “what practices are acceptable” but “what is the most appropriate accounting in the 
circumstance;” that client accounting positions are not brought before the SEC until that 
consultation has taken place; and that full information about the facts and circumstances 
has been made available to the national technical office.
Third, an SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin encourages registrants to discuss accounting 
questions with the Commission’s staff. When a company does so, the SEC’s reaction 
should not be antagonistic if  the position is reasoned, even if the Commission’s staff takes 
issue with the registrant’s proposed solution to the problem. The SEC staff reported to us 
that meetings with registrants are professional and nonconfrontational. Subjecting those 
registrants at a later time to public criticism is counterproductive.
Fourth, if  a company follows an unusual industry accounting practice or the minority 
practice from among a range o f acceptable alternatives, special scrutiny by the auditor and 
the board is essential, as is clear disclosure.
And, finally, changed economic or business circumstances can call into question the 
ongoing appropriateness o f a long-standing accounting practice. Special scrutiny by the 
auditor and the board is warranted.
The “More Broadly Applicable” Accounting Issues 
Cited by the Chief Accountant
The Chief Accountant’s January 1994 speech cited several other “more broadly 
applicable” cases o f questionable accounting practices, including funded catastrophe
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covers, out-of-date discount rates to measure pension and medical obligations, and 
accounting for investments in debt securities. The Panel is not convinced that the “right 
answers” to these accounting questions were as obvious as implied. Further, the Panel 
notes that the matters had been addressed and resolved by the standard setters prior to 
January 1994 and that their characterization as “questionable” was with the benefit o f 
hindsight. Therefore, the Panel sees little benefit from its delving further into these issues.
Cheerleading for Clients
Mr. Schuetze’s speech also expressed concern that CPAs may have become cheerleaders 
for their clients on the issue o f accounting for stock-based compensation. Elsewhere in 
this report the Panel has expressed its thoughts on matters o f client advocacy.
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APPENDIX C 
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